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Abstract 
 This study empirically examines whether the Business Tax reformed 
to value added tax (VAT) policy has an impact on the bargaining power of 
reformed industry firms based on Difference-in-Difference (DID) Model by 
using the A-share companies listed in both Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2010-2015. The bargaining power of firms is 
divided into two parts: the bargaining power of firms when negotiating with 
their suppliers and the bargaining power of firms when negotiating with their 
distributors. We find that the policy does have an impact on the bargaining 
power of reformed industry firms, specifically, the impact of the policy is to 
reduce firms’ bargaining power when negotiating with suppliers and improve 
their bargaining power when negotiating with dealers. 
 
Keywords: Business Tax reformed to VAT, bargaining power, DID model 
1. Introduction 
‘Business Tax reformed to VAT’ policy was firstly put into practice in 
‘1+6’ industries (1 means Transportation industry, 6 means Modern Services 
industry) in Shanghai on January 1, 2012. After that, the reformed area and 
industries experience a gradual expansion in China from May 1, 2016. The 
main purpose of the government to implement the policy is to reduce the tax 
burden of firms, promote economic development and mobilize the enthusiasm 
of all parties. However, the actual effects of the policy in implementation 
process are unsure and very complex. Since the implementation of the policy, 
multifaceted studies have been done to study the actual impacts of it.  
 Early research on this policy mainly focus on the aspects of firm 
performance, change of tax burden, division of labor, investment in innovative 
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intangible assets, etc. Few studies have examined the influences of the policy 
on bargaining power of the firm. Previous studies in this area mainly are 
theoretical analysis and qualitative research. Hu (2013) finds that the upstream 
firms’ bargaining power could be improved because firms are allowed to 
deduct input tax deduction after the implementation of the policy, however he 
uses a qualitative theoretical framework to study this problem. Tong (2015) 
examines the policy’s impact on turnover tax burden basing on different 
bargaining power. However, bargaining power is not the main point of these 
literature. In this study, we intend to explore the effect of ‘Business Tax 
reformed to VAT’ policy’s on firms’ bargaining power. During firms’ 
operation, bargaining power is a very important factor. For example, the costs 
of raw materials are strongly influenced by firms’ bargaining power when 
negotiating with the suppliers. Moreover, the firms’ bargaining power when 
negotiating with the dealers may influence the price of the product, the sales 
revenue and ultimately the corporation’s performance.  
Based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2015, this 
study uses DID model to examine the policy’s impact on bargaining power 
and the possible mechanism of the impact. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops 
our theoretical framework and presents the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the 
sample selection and research design. Descriptive statistics and multivariate 
analysis are presented in section 4. Section 5 presents the conclusions. 
2. Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesis 
Hu (2013) suggest that the ‘Business Tax reformed to VAT’ policy 
might have a certain impact on the bargaining power of firms. After the 
reform, firms are allowed to carry out input VAT deduction. Therefore, the 
upstream manufacturers become the invoice issuer and the downstream 
manufacturers will ask invoice from them in order to deduct input VAT. In the 
bargaining game, this relationship will make the upstream manufacturers 
occupy a favorable position and enhance their bargaining power to a certain 
extent. Relatively, the downstream manufacturers’ bargaining power will be 
weakened. 
As shown in Figure 1, the bargaining power of firms can be divided 
into two parts: dealer bargaining power and supplier bargaining power. For a 
specific firm involved in the reform, relative to its suppliers, the role of the 
firm is the dealer and the bargaining power of it when negotiating with 
suppliers is called the reformed firm’s dealer bargaining power. Relative to 
the dealer, the role of the firm is the supplier. When negotiating with dealers, 
the bargaining power of the reformed firm is called supplier bargaining power. 
In the bargaining game with suppliers, the reformed firms are in the 
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downstream and they ask for invoice. The power of the reformed firms to 
bargain with its suppliers will be weakened, that is, the firms’ dealer 
bargaining power will be weakened. In the bargaining game with dealers, the 
reformed firms are in the upstream and they are the invoice issuer. Since they 
stay in a favorable position, the power of the reformed firms to bargain with 
its dealers will be improved, that is, the firms’ supplier bargaining power will 
be improved.  
Therefore, as a supplier, after the implementation of the policy, the 
firms involved in the reform will have stronger power to bargain with its 
dealers, that means, their supplier bargaining power will be improved. As a 
dealer, after the implementation of the policy, the power of the firm to bargain 
with its suppliers will be weakened, that is, their dealer bargaining power will 
be weakened. Therefore, we state our hypotheses as follows: 
H1: Other things unchanged, compared with the control group of non-
reformed firms, ‘Business Tax reformed to VAT’ policy will weaken the dealer 
bargaining power of experimental group of reformed firms, that is, the 
experimental group’s power to bargain with their suppliers will be weakened.  
H2: Other things unchanged, compared with the control group of non-
reformed firms, ‘Business Tax reformed to VAT’ policy will improve the 
supplier bargaining power of experimental group of reformed firms, that is, 
the experimental group’s power to bargain with their dealers will be 
improved.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Bargaining Power of the Firm 
Suppliers Reformed Firms Dealers 
Dealer Bargaining Power 
of Reformed Firms 
Supplier Bargaining 
Power of Reformed Firms 
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3. Sample Selection and Research Design 
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Source 
Our sample consists of all Chinese A-share listed companies. Our 
sample period is 2010-2015. The Sample selection procedure is outlined as 
follows: we first delete observations with insufficient data to compute firm-
level variables in any year. Then we exclude ST and ST*listed companies. 
Lastly, we trim extreme observations at the 1st and 99th percentiles based on 
the bargaining power. 
We then divide our sample into two groups, the supplier data group 
and the dealer data group. 275 listed companies, a total of 1650 observations 
are included in the supplier data group. 505 listed companies, a total of 3030 
observations are included in the dealer data group. In each group the listed 
companies are further divided into experimental group and control group. The 
listed companies in the experimental group pay business tax before the reform 
while VAT after the reform. The listed companies in the control group pay 
VAT all the time. All the data are collected from the China Securities Markets 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. 
 
3.2 Variable Selection and DID Model 
As mentioned earlier, the bargaining power of firms can be divided 
into dealer bargaining power and supplier bargaining power. When the firm 
bargain with its dealers, it acts as a supplier. Therefore, the firm’s power to 
bargain with its dealers is reflected in its supplier bargaining power. On the 
contrary, when bargaining with suppliers, the firm becomes the dealer. 
Therefore, the firm’s power to bargain with its suppliers is reflected in its 
dealer bargaining power. To construct our empirical proxy for the bargaining 
power of suppliers and distributors, we estimate the concentration of suppliers 
and distributors as the dealer bargaining power and supplier bargaining power. 
Previous studies show that the most commonly used variables to measure the 
concentration of suppliers and distributors are the top five distributors’ and 
suppliers’ share of business. The larger the share of the top five suppliers, the 
higher the concentration of suppliers. Thus, the higher the degree of 
dependence of the firm on the suppliers, the weaker the power of the firm to 
bargain with its suppliers, that is, the weaker the dealer bargaining power of 
the firms. On the other hand, the lower the share of the top five dealers, the 
lower the concentration of dealers. Thus, the lower the degree of dependence 
of the firm on the dealer, the stronger the power of the firm to bargain with its 
dealers (Tang, 2009), that means, the supplier bargaining power of firms is 
stronger. In short, the business share change of the top five dealers and 
suppliers of listed companies will be used to measure the change in supplier 
and dealer bargaining power. 
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When the power of the firm to bargain with its suppliers is weakened, 
the degree of their dependence on suppliers will be improved. Reflected in the 
proxy variables, the share of top five suppliers will increase. At the same time, 
the degree of dependence on dealers will decrease if the power of the firm to 
bargain with dealers is enhanced. Reflected in the proxy variables, the share 
of top five dealers will decrease. Usually, the DID model is used to evaluate 
the impact of the change of the policy (Ye, 2013). This study applies the DID 
model to examine the effect of ‘Business Tax reformed to VAT’ policy’s on 
firms’ bargaining power. We set the reformed listed companies as the treat 
group, and the non-reformed listed companies as the control group. The model 
is constructed as follows:  
𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑡 = 𝛼𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑙𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖
+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑙𝑡 
𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑡 means firm i’s top five suppliers or dealers share in the location of 
province l for year t. We set the indicator variable 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑙𝑡 to 1 if province l 
is included in the reformed area for year t, and 0 otherwise. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 equals 1 if 
firm i is a reformed firm, and 0 otherwise. The difference-in-differences effect 
is captured by 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 . We use 𝜃𝑡 to control the fixed effect of year 
and 𝛿𝑖 to control for the firm fixed effect. The provinces are allowed to have 
different linear trends over time and the changes are showed by the variable 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 . The meaning of each variable is summarized in Table 1, and 
Table 2 shows the change in reformed areas and industries over time. 
Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Variables Meanings 
𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑡 The share of top five suppliers or dealers of firm i in province l 
in year t 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑙𝑡 Whether province l is included in the reformed area in year t or 
not 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 Whether firm i is a reformed firm or not 
𝜃𝑡 The year fixed effect 
𝛿𝑖 The firm fixed effect 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 The product of year dummy variables and province dummy 
variables 
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Table 2. The Change in Reformed Areas and Industries 
The Starting Time Reformed Industry Reformed Areas 
January 1, 2012 ‘1+6’ Industry Shanghai 
September 1, 2012 ‘1+6’ Industry Beijing 
October 1, 2012 ‘1+6’ Industry Anhui Province, Jiangsu 
Province 
November 1, 2012 ‘1+6’ Industry Fujian Province, 
Guangdong Province 
December 1, 2012 ‘1+6’ Industry Hubei Province , 
Zhejiang Province, 
Tianjin Province 
August 1, 2013 ‘1+6’ Industry The Whole Country 
August 1, 2013 Radio and Television Service 
Industry 
The Whole Country 
January 1, 2014 Rail Transport Industry, Postal 
Industry 
The Whole Country 
June 1, 2014 Telecommunications Industry The Whole Country 
Note: ‘1+6’ Industry means 1 Transportation industry plus 6 Modern Services industry 
 
 According to Tong (2015) and Tang (2009), we include firm size 
(natural log of total assets), concentration ratio (Hirschman-Herfindahl Index), 
the nature of firm’s ownership, accounts receivable ratio and accounts payable 
ratio as our control variables. 
In the above model, we focus on the coefficient of 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖. 
Only when Treati and Policyit both equal 1, the variable 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 will 
have an effect on the Power. When 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖   equals 1, it means that 
the firm is a reformed firm in a reformed area and in the reformed year. 
According to hypothesis 1, compared to the non-reformed listed companies, 
the coefficient of 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is expected to be significantly positive if 
the power of reformed firms to bargain with suppliers is indeed weakened. 
According to hypothesis 2, compared to the non-reformed listed companies, 
the coefficient of 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖is expected to be significantly negative if 
the power of reformed firms to bargain with dealers is improved.  
4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 show the descriptive statistics of our main variables. Panel A 
shows the descriptive statistics for the supplier data group while panel B shows 
the descriptive statistics for the dealer data group. The number of observations 
for the dealers’ group is greater than the number of observations for the 
supplier’s data group (3,030 versus 1,650). The mean (median) value of Power 
were 35.717 (31.90) for the supplier data group and 30.845 (45.515) for the 
dealer’s data group. The mean value of Treat is higher for the supplier data 
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group than for the dealer’s data group. There is no big difference of the mean 
value of Policy between these two groups. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables 
Panel A: The Suppliers Data Group (n=1,650) 
Variable Mean  Median 
Standard. 
Deviation. 
Min Max 
Power 35.717  31.90 19.139 0.69 100 
Treat 0.425  0 0.495 0 1 
Policy 0.513  1 0.499 0 1 
Panel B: The Dealers Data Group (n=3,030) 
Variable Mean  Median 
Standard. 
Deviation. 
Min Max 
Power 30.845  45.515 20.873 1.06 100 
Treat 0.143  0 0.35 0 1 
Policy 0.56  1 0.489 0 1 
 
4.2 Empirical Results 
4.2.1 Analysis on the Influence of ‘Business Tax Reformed to VAT’ on 
Firms’ Dealer Bargaining Power 
Table 4. Analysis of the Policy Effects on Dealer Bargaining Power of reformed firm 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS FE FE 
Power_jxs Power_jxs Power_jxs Power_jxs Power_jxs 
Treat -7.142*** -6.914*** -6.941***   
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)   
Policy -2.023** -7.378*** -5.947*** -5.394*** -4.663*** 
 (0.030) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Treat*Policy 13.171*** 13.048*** 13.327*** 12.210*** 11.593*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed Effect of 
Year 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Timetrend   Yes  Yes 
Firm’ Fixed 
Effects 
   Yes Yes 
Constant Term 36.484*** 35.677*** 29.096*** 32.736*** -
1.1e+03*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Control variables included but not reported for the sake of brevity 
N 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 
Within R2 0.036 0.041 0.094 0.117 0.161 
Note: The values in parentheses are P values. All results are calculated using the clustering 
standard error at the provincial level. ***,**and* represent 1%、5%和10%significance 
levels. Power.gys means supplier bargaining power of firms. Power,jxs means dealer 
bargaining power of firms. 
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Results of the policy effects on dealers bargaining power of the 
reformed firm are presented in Table 4. For the sake of comparisons, 
regressions are reported with and without fixed effect of firm and year. 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 are significantly positive in the normal OLS and the fixed 
effect regressions, indicating that the policy does improve the top five 
suppliers’ share of the reformed firm. This suggests that the‘Business Tax 
Reformed to VAT’policy does enhance the top five suppliers’ concentration, 
improve the reformed firms’ degree of dependence on its suppliers, reduce the 
dealers bargaining power of the reformed firm. This supports Hypothesis 1. 
4.2.2 Analysis on the Influence of ‘Business Tax Reformed to VAT’ on 
Firms’ Supplier Bargaining Power 
Table 5. Analysis of the Policy Effects on Supplier Bargaining Power of reformed firm 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS FE FE 
Power_gys Power_gys Power_gys Power_gys Power_gys 
Treat -
12.438*** 
-12.346*** -11.439***   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Policy 1.602* 1.146 2.473** 2.274** 1.724* 
 (0.067) (0.642) (0.017) (0.022) (0.065) 
Treat*Policy -5.284*** -5.409*** -5.416*** -4.706*** -3.472*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) 
Fixed Effect of 
Year 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Timetrend   Yes  Yes 
Firm’s Fixed 
Effect 
   Yes Yes 
Constant Term 43.892*** 43.141*** 33.929*** 39.719*** 619.126*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Control variables included but not reported for the sake of brevity 
N 3030 3030 3030 3030 3030 
Within R2 0.093 0.094 0.144 0.014 0.057 
Note: The values in parentheses are P values. All results are calculated using the 
clustering standard error at the provincial level. ***,**and* represent 1%、5%和
10%significance levels. Power.gys means supplier bargaining power of firms. Power,jxs 
means dealer bargaining power of firms. 
 
Results of the policy effects on suppliers bargaining power of the 
reformed firm are presented in Table 5. For the sake of comparisons, 
regressions are reported with and without fixed effects of firm and year. 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 are significantly negative in the normal OLS and the fixed 
effect regressions, indicating that the policy does reduce the top five dealers’ 
share of the reformed firm. This suggests that the‘Business Tax Reformed to 
VAT’policy does lower the top five dealers’ concentration, weaken the 
reformed firms’ degree of dependence on its dealers, improve the suppliers 
bargaining power of the reformed firm. This supports Hypothesis 2. 
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4.2.3 Sub-industry Test Results 
Then we examine the impact of the policy on the bargaining power of 
different industries and firms. Until 2015, there are three major categories of 
industries that have been reformed: transportation industry, 
telecommunications industry and modern service industry, respectively. 
Among the experimental groups that have been reformed, modern service 
industry includes leasing and business services, cultural sports and 
entertainment, health and social work service, radio and television services, 
and scientific research and technical services. We use the sub-industry test to 
examine whether the policy has significant impacts on the bargaining power 
of firms in reformed industry, whether there is any difference of the impacts 
on different industries. Results are shown in Table 6: 
Table 6.  Empirical Results of Sub-Industry Test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Telecommunications 
Industry 
Transportation 
Industry 
Modern Services 
Industry 
Power_jxs Power_g
ys 
Power_jx
s 
Power_g
ys 
Power_jx
s 
Power_g
ys 
Policy -1.679 1.101 -2.306 0.594 -3.747** 1.309 
 (0.268) (0.243) (0.146) (0.490) (0.011) (0.165) 
Treat*Poli
cy 
11.117*** -2.772* 6.544*** -3.875* 13.187**
* 
-4.164* 
 (0.000) (0.064) (0.006) (0.096) (0.000) (0.062) 
Year Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tinetrend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
Term 
-
914.170*** 
349.396*
** 
731.475*
** 
1376.133
*** 
-86.880 1467.810
*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.673) (0.000) 
Control variables are included but not reported for the sake of brevity 
N 1302 2610 1056 2346 1188 2454 
Within R2 0.145 0.060 0.093 0.071 0.141 0.060 
Note: The values in parentheses are P values. All results are calculated using the clustering 
standard error at the provincial level. ***,**and* represent 1%、5%和10% significance 
levels. Power.gys means supplier bargaining power of firms. Power,jxs means dealer 
bargaining power of firms. 
As can be seen, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 are significantly positive in all regressions of the 
supplier’s data group and significantly negative in all regressions of the dealer’s data group. 
The results are consistent with H1 and H2.  
 
4.2.4 Sub-regional Test Results 
In addition, we also examine the impact of the policy on the bargaining 
power of firms from different regions. In the sub-regional research, we study 
whether the policy has significant impacts on the bargaining power of firms in 
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all reformed areas, whether there is any difference of the impact on firms in 
the specific reformed area. We divide the area into three regions: The Central, 
the West and the East according to National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
Specifically, Shanxi province, Neimenggu province, Jilin province, 
Heilongjiang province, Anhui province, Jiangxi province, Henan province, 
Hubei province, and Hunan province are included in the Central region. The 
West region includes Sichuan province, Chongqing, Guizhou province, 
Yunnan province, Xizang province, Shanxi province, Gansu province, 
Ningxia province, Qinghai province and Xinjiang province. The East region 
includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei province, Liaoning province, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu province, Zhejiang province, Fujian province, Guangdong province, 
Guangxi province and Hainan province. Results are shown in Table 7: 
Table 7.  Empirical Results of Sub-Regional Test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 The East Region The Central Region The West Region 
Power_jxs Power_g
ys 
Power_jxs Power_g
ys 
Power_j
xs 
Power_gys 
Policy -6.063*** 1.294* -2.918 -1.956 -0.665 13.942*** 
 (0.010) (0.078) (0.140) (0.335) (0.856) (0.000) 
Treat*Poli
cy 
12.309*** -3.125** 9.860** -6.795** 10.856 -2.149 
 (0.000) (0.041) (0.012) (0.040) (0.104) (0.704) 
Year Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Timetrend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -
3.1e+03**
* 
537.043 878.387**
* 
-200.388 1193.250 4269.887*
** 
 (0.003) (0.185) (0.000) (0.282) (0.413) (0.001) 
Control variables are included but not reported for the sake of brevity 
N 1236 2154 246 474 168 402 
Within R2 0.180 0.040 0.105 0.105 0.194 0.093 
Note: The values in parentheses are P values. All results are calculated using the clustering 
standard error at the provincial level. ***,**and* represent 1%、5%和10%significance 
levels. Power.gys means supplier bargaining power of firms. Power,jxs means dealer 
bargaining power of firms. 
 
The results are shown in table 7. For the sample from the East region 
and Central region, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is significantly positive in the suppliers 
data group and significantly negative in the dealers data group, indicating that 
‘Business Tax Reformed to VAT’ improves the supplier bargaining power of 
reformed firms in central and eastern regions and weakens the dealers 
bargaining power of them. However, for the sample from the West region, 
although 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is positive in suppliers data group and negative in 
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dealers data group, neither of them is significant. This suggests that the 
bargaining power of the reformed firms in the western region has not been 
significantly affected by the ‘Business Tax Reformed to VAT’ policy. There 
are several reasons for this: First, it is relatively late for the west region to be 
included in the reformed scope, so maybe the policy effect has not been fully 
reflected in such a short period of time. Second, the reformed firms in the 
western region mainly belong to telecommunications industry. It is also very 
late for this industry to be included in the reformed industries. Last but not 
least, the economy of the western region is relatively backward compared to 
the central and eastern regions, and the relevant policy may be more likely to 
be hampered during the implementation. 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 
2015, this study uses the difference-in-differences (DID) model to examine 
the impact of ‘Business Tax Reformed to VAT’ policy on firms’ bargaining 
power. We find that the policy does have a significant impact on the 
bargaining power of the firms in the experimental group. Specifically, the 
policy weakens the firm’s power to bargain with suppliers, that is, the dealers 
bargaining power of the reformed firm is weakened. In addition, the policy 
improves the reformed firms’ power to bargain with dealers, namely, the 
reformed firms’ supplier bargaining power is improved. The sub-industry 
regressions are similar. The sub-regional regressions show that the policy has 
significant impacts on reformed firms in the central and eastern regions while 
the western region has not been significantly influenced. We believe our 
findings are potentially informative to regulators, suppliers and dealers. 
When the dealer bargaining power of the firm is weakened, the costs 
of its raw materials will go up. Assume all the other things stay the same, the 
total product costs of the firm will increase, and the cost of goods sold will 
boost, so the profit of the firm will decline. This will have a negative effect on 
the firm’s performance. However, at the same time, the supplier bargaining 
power of the firm is enhanced, so it can raise the product price to boost sales 
revenue. Firms need to balance these two effects. On one hand, they will take 
full advantage of the benefits brought by the policy. On the other hand, it is 
also necessary for them to try to minimize the negative impacts of the policy. 
The implementation of ‘Business Tax Reformed to VAT’ policy does 
bring benefits to some firms, but it can also have some negative impacts on 
others. How to maximize total welfare of the whole society is a challenge for 
the government. In this study, we find that ‘Business Tax Reformed to VAT’ 
policy affects reformed firms’ bargaining power through input tax deduction. 
The upstream firms are positively affected by the policy while the downstream 
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ones are negatively influenced. This policy may lead to the redistribution of 
social resources and rights and change the competition environment of the 
market. Future research, exploring the role of government in establishing a 
sound value-added tax system corresponding to Chinese laws and regulations, 
would be useful. 
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